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ABSTRACT. The tradition of anthropological medicine in philosophy of medicine is analyzed 
in relation to the earlier interest in epistemological issues in medicine around the turn of the 
century as well as to the current interest in medical ethics. It is argued that there is a con­
tinuity between epistemological, anthropological and ethical approaches in philosophy o f  
medicine. Three basic ideas of anthropologically-oriented medicine are discussed: the rejec­
tion of Cartesian dualism, the notion of medicine as science of the human person, and the 
necessity of a comprehensive understanding of disease. Next, it is discussed why the anthro­
pological movement has been superseded by the increasing interest in medical ethics. It is 
concluded that the present-day moral issues cannot be interpreted and resolved without 
clarification of the underlying anthropological images.
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1. IN T R O D U C T IO N
In the recent history of medical philosophy, examination of the anthropo­
logical basis of medicine has led to an anthropological tradition, particu­
larly in Germany and the Netherlands. This tradition has declined with the 
general and rapid growth of interest in moral issues over the last three 
decades. Recently, patients, philosophers and physicians are becoming more 
aware that many moral problems cannot be resolved without the clarifica­
tion and interpretation of the images of persons that underlie ethical per­
plexities. Such awareness has led to a renewed interest in the writings and 
ideas of anthropologically-oriented scholars of the first half o f this century. 
Since they try to change medical practice and theory “from within,” con­
necting daily experiences with philosophical insights, and delineating a 
renovated science of the human person, they have in fact the same moti­
vations and values as many scholars interested in medical ethics and 
medical philosophy today. This issue of Theoretical Medicine will re­
appraise and present the basic ideas of anthropological medicine. In this
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contribution, we will analyze and briefly describe the tradition of anthro­
pological medicine within the setting of the philosophy of medicine, as 
a continuous attempt over the last hundred years to understand medical 
activities more thoroughly.
2 . THE E V O L U T IO N  OF TH E PH IL O SO PH Y  OF M E D IC IN E
In its history, medicine has maintained a long-standing dialectical relation 
with philosophy. To define the identity of medicine and to demarcate 
medicine as an autonomous discipline, authors of medical treatises used 
to dispute the contemporary speculations about the nature of the world. 
The philosophical conception of order in nature, for example, was useful 
to demarcate medicine from mythology and religion, postulating natural 
disease causation and regularity in the natural history of diseases. The con­
frontation with philosophy led these physicians to discover the relevance 
of experience and precise observation as regards the practise of medicine. 
The emancipation of medicine arose, therefore, not from a rupture with phi­
losophy but from a philosophical reinterpretation of what is characteristic 
of medicine itself.
However, when medicine had become firmly established as a unified 
science of disease, using the methodology of the natural sciences as the 
basis for obtaining and applying knowledge, a fundamental change of the 
relationship with philosophy occurred. Philosophy is no longer in compe­
tition with medicine, itself trying to understand and explain the phenomena 
of illness, suffering, incapacity, and death, but philosophical reflection takes 
the medical approach of these phenomena as its object of analysis. This is 
an important shift in the level of reflection and study. Instead of operating 
at the same conceptual level as medicine and examining the same objects, 
philosophy has moved to a meta-level, analyzing medicine as its proper 
object.
In the emancipatory process of individual sciences a speculative, 
philosophical approach has existed alongside of empirico-experimental 
approaches for some time. Well-known examples are the medical systems
propounded by idealist philosophers in nineteenth century Germany.1 These
i
systems of philosophical medicine were felt to be competitive with the new 
ethos of medicine as a natural science. The long-standing and intimate bond 
between medicine and philosophy was therefore reinterpreted in the last 
century as an antagonistic relationship. Many clashes between the two 
disciplines arose. The conflict was solved by redefining the role and object 
of philosophy vis-à-vis medicine. Philosophy was relocated as a science
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of science on another level of abstraction, not concerned any longer with 
medicine’s object of study and intervention but with the concepts and 
methods employed by medicine in studying and manipulating its objects. 
The outcome of this relocation was the emergence of the philosophy o f  
medicine as a separate intellectual discipline. Conceiving philosophy as a 
meta-activity, thus turned a competitor into a critical ally.
The rise of the philosophy of medicine in the last century was con­
nected with transformations in the social status and the self-image o f  
medicine which were formed in most countries in the second part of the 
century. Until that time medicine was practised by many kinds of healers. 
University-trained physicians were a minority. It was estimated that around 
1840 in the Netherlands 25 types of medical practitioners with various 
forms of training and licenses were working.2 The heterogeneity of medical 
practitioners and their constant struggle over competencies and privileges 
gave rise to much satire, ridiculing the doctors’ ignorance and false pre­
tensions. Medicine was associated with poor status and low income. The 
nineteenth-century process of professionalization reversed this situation. 
One of the claims promoting the creation of an unified and organized 
medical profession was that medicine should be developed and practised 
upon a scientific foundation superior to that of other healers. This claim 
generated a renewed interest in philosophical reflection. Professional 
cohesion and uniformity of medical practise, brought about by external 
forces, were in need of internal justification; they motivated a search for 
the identity of the now unified discipline. What was the specific charac­
teristic of medicine? Formulating answers to this basic question had become 
the modus operandi of the new discipline of the philosophy of medicine.
It is remarkable that from 1870 there was a rapid growth of medico- 
philosophical literature, particularly in Germany, France and Poland. Three 
traditions in the thematic development of the philosophy of medicine over 
the last hundred years can be distinguished; an epistemological tradition 
(flourishing around the turn of the century), an anthropological tradition 
(from 1920 to 1960), and an ethical tradition (attracting increasing atten­
tion from the 1960s onwards). This distinction not only brings some struc­
ture in the history of the philosophy of medicine but it also shows the 
continuity of its basic preoccupations. The few historical studies avail­
able, notably Szumowski’s,3 do not demonstrate any evolution of the dis­
cipline. Retrospectively, there seems to be a haphazard accumulation of 
issues addressed and views criticized. From today’s perspective, it might 
even appear that the philosophy of medicine is a very recent affair and 
that the present preoccupation with medical ethics shows a marked dis­
continuity with earlier efforts to philosophize about medicine.
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However, the present-day domination of medical ethics has been con­
tinuous with the various traditions o f the philosophy of medicine since the 
last century in that it is moved by the same commitments and fundamental 
problems. This continuity will became more apparent by examining the 
other traditions, in particular that of anthropologically-oriented medicine 
which flourished prior to the current interest in ethics.
3. TH E E P IST E M O L O G IC A L  T R A D IT IO N
Initially, the identity and intrinsic coherence of modem medicine has been 
described in epistemological terms. Medicine is characterized as a natural 
science. Essential to this perspective is the method of acquiring and 
applying knowledge. Medicine can only progress through unbiased obser­
vation in the laboratory, the dissection room and at the bedside, through 
collecting facts and deducting conclusions. By following these method­
ological rules rigorously, it can be proved to deserve its recently granted 
external support.
The scientific conception of medicine was a very productive one. But 
precisely the success created problems. With more and more data 
accumulating and new facts multiplying, it became difficult to detect any 
cohesion and common perspective in the rapidly growing body of knowl­
edge. It became hard to believe in an encompassing identity of medicine 
with the proliferation of independent specialisms. It was felt that the unity 
and coherence of medicine were endangered by its own development. When 
medicine found its identity as a natural science, then it seemed to lose that 
identity because of its scientific progress.
These problematic feelings can be recognized in the contemporary 
philosophy of medicine under the slogan “medical synthesis” or the more 
ambiguous catchword “Neo-Hippocratism.”4 Zimmerman5 argues that the 
problems of medicine are twofold: first, medical knowledge is fragmented 
and medical practise is one-sided because of specialization; second, the 
patient as the object of medicine is no longer adequately addressed since 
the conceptual tools of medicine are insufficient and too simple. The 
solution to these problems is synthesis in the realm of medical practice as 
well as in the field of medical thinking. Many agree that it is philosophy 
that can facilitate this solution. It can distinguish between relevant and 
irrelevant knowledge, trivial and crucial findings so that it uncovers the 
general framework and the core concepts of medicine. This philosophical 
activity of sorting out and weighing data is particularly important for 
medical education. Medicine should be presented within a broad perspec-
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tive during philosophical propedeutics for every medical student, as 
Szumowski6 proposes. In general, philosophy has two tasks, argues Inlow.7 
The one has to do with clarifying epistemological issues, the other with 
medical synthesis. The last task has been grossly neglected according to 
Inlow: “It studies the significance and meaning of medicine, its rela­
tionship to other sciences and departments of human activity, its place in 
knowledge and action in general . . . .  In short, it attempts a theoretical 
organization of the whole of the field of medicine.”8 Nevertheless, there 
were serious efforts to meet the challenge, such as the founding of journals 
and the organizing of international conferences.9
At a more fundamental level, with the newly built unity of medicine in 
jeopardy, two different epistemological strategies were deployed to respond 
to the call for synthesis.
The first was the attempt to strengthen the conceptualizing hold of the 
knowing subject according to his or her world. Proliferating knowledge 
needs only to be grasped, placed in order and to be understood as long as 
the subject is using a rigorous methodology. Synthesis therefore is not 
a goal but a method. If medicine in all its specialties and branches will 
critically examine its methods, and will consistently use the same methods, 
it can be reinterpreted and reconsolidated as a stringent natural science. 
Such a project requires a commitment to analytical study and to seeking 
the interconnections of the results, cultivating synthesis not by speculating 
but by reducing the multiplicity of phenomena to basic laws and simply 
processes. No theorizing without facts.
This strategy implies a strong rejection of speculative thinking, and for 
some, of philosophy in general (not recognizing their own point of view  
as philosophical). Famous examples of such negativism are provided by 
Bernard and Bleuler. The best philosophical system in the opinion of  
Bernard10 consists in not having any. And, according to Bleuler, philosophy 
has produced nothing but a graveyard of theoretical systems; it is useless, 
at best only having historical value. Medicine must not be contaminated 
by philosophy; it would be “a mixture of garlic and chocolate.”11 Con­
tamination is dangerous because philosophy prevents the formation o f  
realistic ideas. Bleuler even went so far as to insinuate that philosophizing 
itself may be a symptom of a morbid thinking-faculty.12
The second strategy is more interesting than the first because it 
questions the status of the knowing subject itself. Instead of instigating 
the subject in order to advance methodically towards objectivity and pre­
ciseness, it calls for appreciation of its own subjectivity. Central in this 
strategy is the self-interpretation of medicine as an art. Richard Koch for 
example defines medicine as Heilkunst and as “a specific, educated kind
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of assistance.”13 Being a practical art, medicine is situated between the 
unconscious reflex to help, elicited by the infirm, and the analytic work of 
the scientist. If medicine must be characterized as an art, special attention 
must be given to the personality of the doctor. The personal qualities of 
the artist determine his or her achievements. The conclusion of this philo­
sophical position is summarized by Honigmann: “Being a physician means 
being a whole human being.”14 Gradually, it was recognized that medicine 
is more concerned with acting than knowing. When the personal qualities 
of the physician are so important for the accomplishments of medicine, 
serious doubts could arise about the central role of epistemological issues 
in philosophizing.
4. THE A N T H R O P O L O G IC A L  T R A D IT IO N
The interpretation of medicine as an art evolved into a new conception of 
medicine as anthropological medicine. It was popular, particularly in 
Germany and the Netherlands, from approximately 1920 until 1960. The 
main contenders were F. Buytendijk, V. von Weizsacker, V. von Gebsattel, 
H. Plügge, and P. Christian. Many advocates of anthropologically-oriented 
medicine were practising physicians who became prolific writers with a 
broad interest in the humanities. Their main interest was to redefine and 
reinterpret medicine as a science of man. In philosophically rethinking 
medical activities they used ideas from several contemporary philo­
sophical schools, particularly phenomenology (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty), 
existentialism (Marcel, Sartre), and philosophical anthropology (Scheler, 
Gehlen, Plessner). In their writings, they tried to reflect upon human exis­
tence in its concrete specificity and ambiguity. Instead of starting from or 
working towards an ideal image of the human being, they attempted to 
identify what is anthropologically characteristic and common to human 
beings. But at the same time they were very much aware that any image 
was too abstract and “clean,” because in everyday reality the specific indi­
vidual was always changing, pluriform, and was not fully described by 
the designed image of a person.15 Given this theoretical point of view, advo­
cates of anthropological medicine have not presented a clear-cut theory that 
has been defended and elaborated upon by all representatives. Furthermore, 
as physicians they preferred casuistry over systematic exposition, empir­
ical practise over consistent theory. Their ideal was to change medicine 
from within, not from an external basis of general theoretical views. 
Individualized medical activities were prior to any systematic and theo­
retical approach. The subsequent works of Von Weizsacker about clinical
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presentations,16 clinical cases,17 the ill person,18 and even the composition 
of the latter books (casuistry first, then theoretical exposition) illustrate this 
“method.”
Notwithstanding the lack of systematic unity found in the works of advo­
cates of anthropological medicine, there is a certain “family of ideas” that 
became influential at that time. Recently, many studies have examined the 
basic tenets of this movement, and have argued for the relevancy of the 
ideas for contemporary medicine.19"25
4.1. Rejection o f Cartesian Dualism
One basic idea in the anthropological tradition is that human beings cannot 
be subdivided into a physical and mental compartment. Although medicine 
has profited from this subdivision, it has also restricted itself to the human 
body by studying and explaining the body’s physico-chemical machinery. 
This medical approach of the human being and its body should be criti­
cized because it reduces the human being to a specific animal species, and 
the human characteristics of the human body to its physical level of being. 
Even psychosomatic medicine has not overcome dualism since any assump­
tion of an interaction between body and mind implies a separateness of two 
substancies. Any demarcation between body and mind is artificial. Dualistic 
thinking, moreover, not only involves a reduced image of the human person, 
but it also has a more general tendency. The focus of critique is the general 
distinction made between object and subject. Von Weizsäcker, for example, 
strongly rejects the idea that there is an objective, real world, independent 
from an isolated, individual subject. A human being cannot relate him/ 
herself to the world as an neutral observer. We cannot know the world in 
which we live, without at the same time changing it.26
4.2. Medicine as Science o f the Human Person
Anthropologically-oriented physicians argue that the methodology of the 
natural sciences is not fully appropriate in the context of health care. 
Scientific methods used to be abstract, analytical; they proceeded from a 
model of linear causality. These methods also focussed on intervention, 
control and manipulation, introducing the technical point of view of the 
engineer into the domain of disease and suffering.
Such critique does not conclude that the causal thinking and technical 
approach of the natural sciences should not be allowed in medicine; on 
the contrary, they are highly valuable and useful; but medical thinking and 
practising should not restrict itself to these scientific methods. In the words
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of Von Weizsäcker: “Medicine is not technology; it is technology, too.”27 
Instead of rejecting scientific methods, they should be considered according 
to their relative value. The problem is that such methods cannot grasp what 
is essential to human beings. As a living organism, every person consti­
tutes a whole, a meaningful entity, which is disconnected and distintegrated 
by abstract, analytical approaches. Buytendijk, for example, argues that 
from the mechanical viewpoint of the scientific method only those aspects 
of living organisms can be explained, that are not intrinsic to life itself. 
This method can be applied to human beings, but it will naturally remain 
within a theoretical intermediate sphere, since it is always disengaging itself 
from human existence.28 Anatomical, physiological and biochemical 
research only determines the conditions, teaches us what is possible and 
probable -  not what really happens. The macroscopic images of bodily 
events, the dynamic Gestalt, and the intrinsic meaningful connections have 
disappeared from the scientific view. To examine the living being, we 
should participate in life, and focus upon the purposeful coherence and 
interrelationships, the significance of experience and conduct. If medicine 
wants to evolve into a science of the human person, it should overcome 
the usual distinction between the objective and subjective. This means that 
the subject should be introduced into medicine. If medicine is not objec­
tive, it is impossible; if medicine is only an objective science, it is 
inhuman.29
4,3. Comprehensive Understanding o f Disease
The conception of disease, current in modern medicine, is incomplete, 
according to anthropologically-oriented doctors. The reason is not that the 
science of pathology is insufficient and not fully developed, but that 
pathology operates with inadequate notions and assumptions. Focusing on 
the causal mechanism of disease, medicine cannot fully understand the ill 
person, because explaining disease also refers to the problem of the sig­
nificance of a symptom, the meaning of a particular complaint. Science- 
based medicine in fact hinders that insight that disease has meaning; in its 
approach the only relevant question concerns the pathogenesis and patho­
physiology of the disease; the anthropological question “Why here and 
now” is irrelevant. The argument is not that medicine should address the 
psychological dimensions of disease more. Since dualistic thinking is 
rejected, we cannot say that the body and/or the mind are involved in the 
disease process; it is impossible to find out “where or who started the 
disease,” thereby recognizing the primacy of body or mind.
Anthropologically-oriented physicians argue that it is impossible not to
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consider that disease has meaning. The body gives expression to the human 
person. Disease therefore gives voice to a threatened existence; it is, in Von 
Weizsacker’s words, “eine Materialisierung des Konfliktes.”30 Being ill 
primarily is an existential category; only secondarily, we can make any 
differentiation between organic and psychic suffering. Being ill is a way 
of being a human person. When I not only have my life, but also give 
expression to it, when I not merely have my body, but also am my body 
at the same time, then it is also the case that I am not only having my 
disease and suffering it, but also make my disease. Thus, being ill is a 
response of the person to his or her own individual existence. In this 
perspective, disease is not a negative event, a blind fate, waiting to be 
eliminated from the world; the important thing is what we make of it, 
whether we consider it as an occasion to reconsider and improve our life.
5. THE ETH IC A L FO L LO W -U P
It seems amazing that the anthropological orientation has been so rapidly 
superseded by the growing interest in medical ethics since the 1960s, After 
all, there is a marked continuity between both phases in the philosophy of 
medicine. By concentrating on the subjectivity of the patient, anthropo­
logical medicine has paved the way for the subsequent interest in ethical 
issues in health care. The programmatical demand of Von Weizsacker 
to introduce the subject into the life sciences and medicine implied not 
only acknowledging the subjectivity of the knowing and acting subject 
(the physician) but also that of the object (the patient). Doctor as well as 
patient experience themselves as psychosomatic organisms. That means 
for example that medicine should examine the relation between personal 
biography and illness. The identity of medicine, therefore, is constituted 
through internal determinants, viz. the personal qualities of its practitioners, 
but, more significantly, also through external determinants, viz. the indi­
vidual qualities of patients. Medicine is a unique profession in systemati­
cally and methodically attending to the patient as an irreducible person.
The tradition of anthropological medicine made visible and laid open, 
so to speak, the moral dimension of medicine. It did so by criticizing the 
presuppositions of the dominant conception of medicine as natural science, 
and by incorporating medical science’s analytical methods and mechanistic 
image of a human being in a broader framework of an authentic science 
of humans. The point is that anthropological medicine brought to the fore 
the fact that the internal characteristics of medicine are not identifiable 
without involving the external context. In fact, it appears that anthropo-
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logical medicine is itself a normative program, an extended argument for 
a normative science of life. This is evident for example in the Weizsackerian 
concept of the subject which includes “organic” and “pathic” subjectivity: 
the subject is an acting subject, performing biological acts, as well as a 
sentient and perceiving subject. The concept of a pathic subject originates 
from the practical context of medicine in which life is not an event but an 
experience, not activity but passivity. The pathic subject has to suffer and 
endure the existence (it is “subjectum”). Von Weizsacker’s philosophy is 
an attempt to reconcile organic life (zooe) and biographical life (bios). 
Scientific medicine must recognize and do justice to the dual nature of the 
subject. Medicine’s understanding of humanity is limited as long as it con­
centrates on the physiological, organic and ontic aspects of life. It has to 
accept that any human life . fits within the ‘pathic’ categories of want, 
must, can, may and shall.”31 These categories are in the end normative. 
They embody values and ideals that must be realized in human life to call 
it really human (bios). It is through the uncovering and construction of a 
normative dimension of medicine, as really essential to its identity, that 
the anthropological phase is, in the formal respect, continuous with the 
ethical phase. Without a conception of medicine as an anthropological, 
and eventually normative science, the later upsurge of interest in moral 
issues would not have gone so fast.
As regard to continuity, it is also obvious, however, that a considerable 
discontinuity exists between both phases. This discontinuity is manifest 
when we look at the material components of the normative dimension of 
medicine. Within the anthropological approach, the intended normative 
science of life is primarily dependent on the person of the physician. It is 
he or she who uses the criteria to appraise what subjectivity really means. 
As Von Weizsacker’s clinical case analysis shows, on many occasions the 
meaning of illness is concealed from the individual patient, while the physi­
cian knows how to uncover its meaning from the patient’s biography.32 
In practice, anthropological medicine has shown a tendency towards pater­
nalism. The patient is indeed introduced into the self-interpretation of 
medicine but his or her role is staged by the anthropological director.
Another point is the emphasis upon pathic subjectivity. Its connotation 
of passivity has been more and more out of tune with the revolutionary 
development of medicine, particularly since the 1960s. In an era in which 
medicine has become an exemplar of technoscience and technical power, 
reflection should focus on notions as activity, intervention, control, and 
manipulation. The concept of the pathic subject therefore opened up the 
normative dimension of medicine, but, having done so, it was no longer 
generative in making sense of the normativity.
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6. C O N C L U SIO N
The overwhelming impact of moral issues in post-modern health care, as 
well as the urgency to address and resolve such issues, has induced a certain 
amnesia concerning the various perspectives that used to be characteristic 
of the philosophy of medicine. In order to understand and clarify the 
problems of present-day medicine, epistemological, anthropological and 
ethical perspectives are all indispensable. The identity of medicine 
nowadays is no longer solely based upon internal characteristics (the special 
kind of knowledge, the art-like application of its practitioners) but also 
upon external determinants (such as the personal qualities of patients). But 
this insight implies recognition that medicine itself is part of society and 
culture, and indeed is one of the most powerful expressions o f culture. 
Dominating cultural values (such as “immortality” and “invulnerability”) 
have been specifically articulated in contemporary medicine. The question 
what medicine essentially is, is no longer answered by medicine itself. 
The response is apparently the outcome of ideas and values prevailing in 
societies and cultures. Instead of the objectivity of medical knowledge, now 
the value of knowledge is of paramount importance. Instead of the exis­
tential meaning of illness, now the social meaning of medical action is in 
need of clarification. The agenda for the philosophy of medicine is there­
fore changing. The important item is not “What do we know?” but “What 
do we want to do with our knowledge?” At present, medicine is identified 
as a complex of meaningful knowledge and practices. But these changing 
questions presuppose one common denominator: that of the human being. 
Philosophical elucidation of what it is to be a human being and to be treated 
as a human being, will therefore be inevitable for any theory of medical 
practice.
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